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Abstract
In this study, we examine business cycle spillovers in the European Union based on the
spillover index of Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012) over the period 1977–2014. The results
of our analysis reveal that: (i) The total spillover indices are of high magnitude and very
responsive to extreme economic events. (ii) The direction and magnitude of spillovers among
group members (i.e. Eurozone core, Eurozone periphery, new Euro Area countries and
non-EMU countries) is changing overtime. (iii) The Eurozone periphery is the dominant
transmitter of shocks followed by the new EA members, whereas the main recipient of shocks
is the Eurozone core. (iv) In terms of country specific results, the Eurozone peripheral
countries of Spain, Portugal and Greece are the dominant transmitters of business cycle
shocks, whereas Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are the dominant transmitters of
shocks from the new EA members. (v) During the Great Recession, the US is at the epicentre
of business cycle transmission. (vi) Finally, the widening of the European debt crisis can
be explained by business cycle shocks in the whole Eurozone periphery. Thus, appropriate
macroprudential stabilisation policies aiming to steer peripheral economies towards growth,
away from turbulence and close to recovery, should be formulated.
Keywords: European Union, Business cycle, Spillover, Variance decomposition, Vector
autoregression, Impulse response function
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1. Introduction
The recent global economic developments have revived the interest on the propagation
mechanisms of economic shocks among European countries. The transmission of business
∗Corresponding author: e-mail: nikolaos.antonakakis@wu.ac.at, phone: +43 1313364133, fax: +43
131336904133.
cycle shocks among member–states is now becoming of major interest and concern, given
that the effects of the debt crisis are still rippling through the European economy. To this
end, there is an ongoing discussion concerning the origins of the European debt crisis among
member–states. Yet, there is only anecdotal evidence as to which country was responsible
for initiating this crisis, as well as, on how shocks are transmitted both within and between
European economies.
This research purports to increase our understanding regarding business cycle synchro-
nisation among European countries. In particular, by employing the novel spillover index
approach proposed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012) this study concentrates on spillover
effects generated among business cycles shocks, aiming to shed additional light on issues re-
volving around the business cycle synchronisation among the EU15 and the EU28 member-
countries, as well as, among the EU15, China and the US; the last two, specifically employed
in order to capture global effects. This spillover index methodology has already attracted
significant attention by the economic literature, investigating issues such as stock market
co–movements, volatility spillovers and bond yields spillovers (see, inter alia, McMillan and
Speight, 2010; Yilmaz, 2010; Buba´k et al., 2011; Antonakakis, 2012b; Zhou et al., 2012;
Antonakakis and Vergos, 2013).
As will be explained in greater detail below, there are various channels through which
spillovers can be generated and affect business cycle synchronisation among countries. To
facilitate the discussion, current literature identifies four main channels; that is, the trade
channel, the exchange rate channel, the financial integration channel, as well as, the con-
fidence channel (Eickmeier, 2007). It is also worth noting that many authors have so far
investigated cyclical synchronisation issues on the basis of these channels (see, inter alia,
Canova and Dellas, 1993; Imbs, 2004; Eickmeier, 2007; Imbs, 2010; Claessens et al., 2012).
However, little attention has been given to the spillovers which can be generated among
business cycles shocks (two exceptions are Yilmaz, 2009; Antonakakis and Badinger, 2014).
Yilmaz (2009) applies the spillover index methodology by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) to
seasonally adjusted monthly industrial production series for the G-6 countries over the pe-
riod 1958–2010 to identify how shocks to industrial production in one country affect the
industrial output in other countries. In principle, he maintains that business cycle spillovers
can be used to explain business cycle synchronisation, implying that a higher spillover index
reflects higher degree of business cycle co–movements. Antonakakis and Badinger (2014)
employ the spillover index methodology by Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) on annual data for
27 developed and developing countries over the period 1870–2012, and find that: (i) interna-
tional business cycle spillovers vary considerably over time. In particular, the authors find
a clear increasing trend since the end of World War II and until the mid-1980s. After that,
international business cycle interdependencies declined during the period that was dubbed
the Great Moderation and stabilized around the beginning of the twenty-first century. Dur-
ing the Great Recession of 2008-2009, international business cycle spillovers increased to
unprecedented levels. (iii) Developed countries are consistently ranked as net transmitters
of cyclical shocks to developing counties. In this regard, we build on Yilmaz (2009) work and
by adopting the Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012) spillover index approach, we investigate
both directional and net spillovers, as well as, spillovers across the county groups of EU15,
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EU28, and China and the US (global effect).
The period of study extends from 1977 to 2014. The chosen period allows the examination
of cyclical interdependencies over a span of time where many significant economic events
took place, not only in Europe, but also globally (e.g. the financial crisis of 1987, the collapse
of the Soviet Union in 1989, the ERM II crisis in 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the inception
of the EMU in 1999, the Great Recession of 2007-2009, as well as, the ongoing European
debt crisis which began in the ending of 2009).
Research on business cycles can be traced back in time to the work of Mitchell (1927),
Burns and Mitchell (1946), Kuznets (1958), Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963). Investi-
gating the factors that drive fluctuating levels of economic activity, as well as, purporting to
decipher the forces that determine the duration of business cycles became a rather promis-
ing field of research and gained much prominence especially during the 1990s when it was
initially established that output fluctuations in both industrialised and developing countries
share many common characteristics (see, inter alia, Backus et al., 1993; Gregory and Smith,
1996; Baxter and King, 1999; Lumsdaine and Prasad, 2003; Kose et al., 2003). A thorough
description of the relevant literature can be found in Inklaar et al. (2008) and Papageorgiou
et al. (2010).
The importance of European business cycle synchronisation lies on the fact that it is a
pre-requisite for the smooth and efficient operation of monetary policy within a currency-
union. The building blocks of a theory of optimum currency area were laid in the work of
Mundell (1961). In his work Mundell (1961) stresses the necessity for one single currency
and one central bank responsible for the countries comprising this area and also emphasizes
the importance for the area to maintain a flexible exchange rate with the rest of the world.
Furthermore, Rogoff (1985), Gertler et al. (1999), Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2006), as well as,
Savva et al. (2010), are among others who put forward the argument that unless business
cycles within the currency union are synchronised, then asymmetric shocks that will hit each
individual economy (or asymmetric individual responses to symmetric shocks) will inevitably
lead to predicaments in a uniform monetary policy implementation and to destabilisation.
However, making inferences about economic phenomena is rarely as simple as it initially
appears and empirical evidence can at times be contradicting. Thus, the current literature
of the European business cycle synchronisation has produced inconclusive findings. In par-
ticular, many authors (see, inter alia, Fatas, 1997; Angeloni and Dedola, 1999; Belo, 2001;
Altavilla, 2004; Weyerstrass et al., 2011) argue that higher levels of synchronisation can
indeed be reported early on in the 1990s. Even more, some provide evidence that cyclical
interdependencies have increased even further with the establishment of the EMU (see, in-
ter alia, Gayer, 2007; Darvas and Szapa´ry, 2008; Michaelides et al., 2013). De Pace (2013)
pertaining to both the globalisation and the currency union effects on business cycle syn-
chronisation, also reports that the establishment of the European Monetary Union (EMU)
in 1999 was followed by clear evidence of higher correlations among the business cycles of
certain European countries.
Contrary to the exponents of business cycle convergence due to the establishment of
currency-union, other authors voice the opinion that what happened in the years that fol-
lowed the establishment of the EMU was actually quite the opposite. To begin with, Lehwald
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(2012) argues that higher levels of cyclical interdependence are a fact only for core European
economies rather than for the whole EMU member countries. Along a similar vein, authors
such as Hughes Hallett and Richter (2008) and Crespo-Cuaresma and Ferna´ndez-Amador
(2013a) provide evidence to suggest that since the adoption of the common currency, busi-
ness cycles among European member–countries have become rather divergent. Lee (2012,
2013) further reports that the degree of synchronisation among European countries was ac-
tually higher before the EMU. On a final note regarding the EMU, Canova et al. (2012) in
a recent study opine that researchers should be very cautious when linking developments in
the behaviour of European cyclical interdependencies to institutional changes in Europe.
A recent strand of the literature examines the effects of the latest financial crisis on
synchronisation levels in Europe. Authors such as Ga¨chter et al. (2012) and Gomez et al.
(2012) in analysing a group of European countries for the period during and after the Great
Recession provide evidence that, since the outbreak of the crisis, the prevailing pattern
was the decoupling of business cycles. On top of that, some studies stress the necessity to
investigate not only the contemporaneous synchronisation of business cycles but also their
lead/lag relationship (see, for instance Darvas and Szapa´ry, 2008; Gouveia and Correia,
2008; Weyerstrass et al., 2011, among others), which refers to the transmission mechanisms
of business cycle shocks. In this regard, empirical research should also turn its focus to
spillover effects among business cycles.
Business cycle shocks may be transmitted across economies via four main channels. In
short, there is the trade channel, the exchange rate channel, the financial integration channel,
as well as, the confidence channel (Eickmeier, 2007). More specifically, the trade channel
is explained on the basis of higher exports in one country as a result of higher demand
for imports in another country (Canova and Dellas, 1993; Kose and Yi, 2006). According
to Clark and van Wincoop (2001) and Calderoˇn et al. (2007) this channel is of particular
importance to EMU countries, as monetary unions tend to foster trade among their members.
Furthermore, Calderoˇn et al. (2007) maintain that the positive impacts of trade intensity are
better realised when countries exhibit similar production structures. A different perspective
is offered by Ng (2010) who puts forward the argument that the effects of trade intensity
on business cycle synchronisation are stronger when countries specialise in different stages
of the production process. On a final note, Davis and Huang (2011) provide evidence to
support the view that changes in the terms of trade (i.e. the relative price of exports in
terms of imports) affect countries’ business cycles and their synchronisation.
The exchange rate channel, on the other hand, pertains to positive shocks in foreign
economies which result in the depreciation of the local currency. Subsequently this could
lead to an increase of domestic country’s competitiveness and thus to an improvement of the
domestic trade balance. On the downside, this depreciation could also result in importing
inflation (Eickmeier, 2007).
Turning to the financial integration channel, this can bear both positive and negative
spillover effects. In particular, we maintain that financial markets and business cycles are
closely related and thus higher level of integration among financial markets could lead to
stronger spillover effects among business cycles. This is in line with Claessens et al. (2012)
who argue that disturbances in financial markets are associated with bust phases of busi-
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ness cycles. The Great Recession of 2007–2009 is a representative example supporting this
argument. Furthermore, financial integration allows for greater capital mobility and in this
regard, capital flows from a domestic economy to a foreign economy may very well harm the
former and improve output levels in the latter (see, inter alia, Canova and Marrinan, 1998;
Imbs, 2004). By contrast, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013) show that higher levels of financial
integration lead to a decoupling of business cycles.
Finally, the confidence channel reflects the response of domestic agents to potential
spillovers deriving from foreign shocks to the local economy. In addition, the strength of
the spillover depends on whether agents over- or under-react to (asymmetric) information
about foreign shocks (Eickmeier, 2007).
Apparently, despite the fact that many studies have been carried out relating to busi-
ness cycle synchronisation (see, Artis et al., 2011; Antonakakis, 2012a; Lee, 2012; Crespo-
Cuaresma and Ferna´ndez-Amador, 2013a,b; Degiannakis et al., 2014, among others) only
Yilmaz (2009) explicitly focuses on spillovers among business cycles shocks. Thus, this study
adds to this strand of the literature by investigating European business cycle spillovers among
EU15 and EU28 member-countries, in a time-varying environment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the application of
the spillover index approach and describes the data used. Section 3 presents the empirical
findings for the EU15 and EU28. Section 4 focuses on the spillover effects of non–EU
countries. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the results and concludes the study.
2. Empirical Methodology and Data
2.1. Spillover methodology
The spillover index approach introduced by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) builds on the
seminal work on VAR models by Sims (1980) and the well-known notion of variance decom-
positions. It allows an assessment of the contributions of shocks to variables to the forecast
error variances of both the respective and the other variables of the model. Using rolling-
window estimation, the evolution of spillover effects can be traced over time and illustrated
by spillover plots. For the purpose of the present study, we use the variant of the spillover
index in Diebold and Yilmaz (2012), which extends and generalizes the method in Diebold
and Yilmaz (2009).
Starting point for the analysis is the following P -th order, N -variable VAR
yt =
P∑
i=1
Θiyt−i + zt + εt (1)
where yt = (y1t, y2t, . . . , yNt) is a vector of N endogenous variables, Θi, i = 1, ..., P, are
N × N parameter matrices, zt is an exogenous variable capturing global shocks (in our
case the index of general real economic activity developed by Kilian, 2009) that may affect
all countries simultaneously.1 εt ∼ (0,Σ) is vector of disturbances that are independently
distributed over time; t = 1, ..., T is the time index and n = 1, ..., N is the variable index.
1The index of global real economic activity (GEA) in industrial commodity markets has been extracted
from Lutz Kilian’s website at: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~lkilian/paperlinks.html
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Key to the dynamics of the system is the moving average representation of model (1),
which is given by yt =
∑∞
j=0Ajεt−j, where the N ×N coefficient matrices Aj are recursively
defined as Aj = Θ1Aj−1 + Θ2Aj−2 + . . . + ΘpAj−p, where A0 is the N × N identity matrix
and Aj = 0 for j < 0.
Following Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) we use the generalized VAR framework of Koop
et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998), which produces variance decompositions invariant
to the variable ordering. According to this framework, the H-step-ahead forecast error
variance decomposition is
φij(H) =
σ−1jj
∑H−1
h=0 (e
′
iAhΣej)
2∑H−1
h=0 (e
′
iAhΣA
′
hei)
, (2)
where Σ is the (estimated) variance matrix of the error vector ε, σjj the (estimated) standard
deviation of the error term for the j-th equation and ei a selection vector with one as the i-th
element and zeros otherwise. This yields a N × N matrix φ(H) = [φij(H)]i,j=1,...N , where
each entry gives the contribution of variable j to the forecast error variance of variable i.
The main diagonal elements contain the (own) contributions of shocks to the variable i to
its own forecast error variance, the off-diagonal elements show the (cross) contributions of
the other variables j to the forecast error variance of variable i.
Since the own– and cross–variable variance contribution shares do not sum to one under
the generalized decomposition, i.e.,
∑N
j=1 φij(H) 6= 1, each entry of the variance decomposi-
tion matrix is normalized by its row sum, such that
φ˜ij(H) =
φij(H)∑N
j=1 φij(H)
(3)
with
∑N
j=1 φ˜ij(H) = 1 and
∑N
i,j=1 φ˜ij(H) = N by construction.
This ultimately allows to define a total (volatility) spillover index, which is given by
TS(H) =
∑N
i,j=1,i 6=j φ˜ij(H)∑N
i,j=1 φ˜ij(H)
× 100 =
∑N
i,j=1,i 6=j φ˜ij(H)
N
× 100 (4)
which gives the average contribution of spillovers from shocks to all (other) variables to the
total forecast error variance.
This approach is quite flexible and allows to obtain a more differentiated picture by
considering directional spillovers: Specifically, the directional spillovers received by variable
i from all other variables j are defined as
DSi←j(H) =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i φ˜ij(H)∑N
i,j=1 φ˜ij(H)
× 100 =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i φ˜ij(H)
N
× 100 (5)
and the directional spillovers transmitted by variable i to all other variables j as
DSi→j(H) =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i φ˜ji(H)∑N
i,j=1 φ˜ji(H)
× 100 =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i φ˜ji(H)
N
× 100. (6)
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Notice that the set of directional spillovers provides a decomposition of total spillovers into
those coming from (or to) a particular source.
By subtracting Equation (5) from Equation (6) the net spillovers from variable i to all
other variables j are obtained as
NSi(H) = DSi→j(H)−DSi←j(H), (7)
providing information on whether a country (variable) is a receiver or transmitter of shocks
in net terms. Put differently, Equation (7) provides summary information about how much
each variable contributes to the volatility in other variables, in net terms.
The spillover index approach provides measures of the intensity of interdependence across
countries and variables and allows a decomposition of spillover effects by source and recipient.
2.2. Data description
We collect monthly observations of industrial production as a proxy measure for economic
activity for each of the EU28 countries, as well as the US and China. Data availability and
sources are provided in Table A.1 in the Appendix.
All series are seasonally adjusted. Given that we are interested in business cycles inter-
dependencies, we use the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtered series of the natural logarithm of
seasonally adjusted industrial production series (with a smoothing parameter of 129,600),
as this is the most common indicator of business cycles.2
[Insert Table 1 here]
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the business cycle series for each country.
As far as European countries are concerned, business cycles of higher magnitude can be
observed mainly for new EU countries such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia,
but also for older members such as Ireland and Sweden. By contrast, business cycles of
lower magnitude can be observed for France, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain and the UK.
Turning our attention to sample countries outside Europe, we notice that China exhibits
cycles of greater magnitude compared to those of the US. Most series are leptokurtic and
exhibit negative skewness with the exception of the series regarding Cyprus, Croatia and
Malta (platykurtic), as well as, China and Ireland which are positively skewed. The negative
skewness indicates that bust phases of business cycles have a higher magnitude compared to
boom phases. Especially for European countries, this could potentially be attributed to the
effect of the two latest Euro Area (EA) recessions. Furthermore, all series apart from the
one concerning Portugal reveal non–normality. Finally, according to the ADF–test statistic,
all cycles are stationary.
2However, we have explored the robustness of our empirical findings by employing alternative measures
of business cycles, such as the band pass filter and the 12-difference growth rates of industrial productions,
and our results described below remain qualitatively similar.
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3. Empirical findings
In this section we present the results from our empirical analysis, starting with the estimates
of the spillover index and its subindices, defined in Equations (4)-(7). We then consider the
time-varying nature of spillovers indices.
3.1. EU15
3.1.1. Spillover Indices
Table 2 presents the results of the spillover indices based on 24-month ahead forecast error
variance decompositions. Before discussing the results, however, we shall first describe the
elements of the table. The ij−th entry in Table 2 is the estimated contribution to the
forecast error variance of variable i coming from innovations to variable j (see Equation
(2)). Note that each variable is associated with one of the EU15 business cycles. Hence, the
diagonal elements (i = j) measure own–country spillovers of business cycles, while the off–
diagonal elements (i 6= j) capture cross–country spillovers of business cycles. In addition,
the row sums excluding the main diagonal elements (labeled ‘Directional from others’, see
Equation (5)) and the column sums (labeled ‘Directional to others’, see Equation (6)) report
the total volatility spillovers ‘to’ (received by) and ‘from’ (transmitted by) each variable. The
difference between each (off-diagonal) column sum and each row sum gives the net spillovers
from variable i to all other variables j (see Equation (7)). The total volatility spillover index
defined in Equation (4), given in the lower right corner of Table 2, is approximately equal to
the grand off-diagonal column sum (or row sum) relative to the grand column sum including
diagonals (or row sum including diagonals), expressed in percentage points.3
[Insert Table 2 here]
Several interesting results emerge from Table 2. First, own–country business cycle spillovers
explain the highest share of forecast error variance, as the diagonal elements receive higher
values compared to the off-diagonal elements. For example, innovations to business cycles in
Greece explain 73.63% of the 24-month forecast error variance of business cycles in Greece,
while only 0.30% in Germany and 0.92% in France. However, innovations to business cycles
in Germany explain 28.43% of the 24-month forecast error variance of business cycles in
Germany, while only 1.23% in Greece and 8.81% in France. In this regard, the preliminary
evidence shows that shocks originating from the Greek economy tend to be contained within
the Greek borders.
Second, Spain is the dominant transmitter of business cycle shocks followed by the UK
and Luxembourg, while Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Portugal and Ireland are
dominant receivers of business cycles shocks. These results are supported by the ‘directional
to others’ row and the ‘directional from others’ column in Table 2. They are also supported
by the net directional spillovers values, which measure the net spillovers from country i to
3The approximate nature of the claim stems from the fact that the contributions of the variables in the
variance decompositions do not sum to one and have to be normalized (see Equation (3)).
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all other economies j, reported in the last column of Table 2. Specifically, Spain is the
dominant country in business cycle transmission with a net spillover of 168.78%4 to all
other countries’ business cycles followed by UK (73.33%), Luxembourg (40.27%), Germany
(5.22%) and France (4.17%), while Austria is the dominant net receiver of business cycle
shocks (-64.77%) from all other countries’ business cycles with a net spillover, followed
by Belgium (-49.85%), Finland (-37.68%), Denmark (-33.81%), Portugal (-25.01%), the
Netherlands (-20.15%), Ireland (-20.07%), Italy (-18.19%), Greece (-13.99%) and Sweden
(-7.26%). These results are of great importance as, for instance, business cycle shocks in
any individual EU15 country may have certain repercussions for other countries and thus,
it can be a good indicator of future changes in their business cycles.
Third, and most importantly, according to the total spillover index reported at the lower
right corner of Table 2, which effectively distils the various directional spillovers into one
single index, on average, 53.96% of the forecast error variance in EU15 countries’ business
cycles comes from spillovers of shocks across countries, while the remainder can be explained
by own-country shocks.
In summary, the results reported in Table 2 suggest that, on average, both the total
and directional spillovers of business cycles within the EU15 countries were extremely high
during our sample period, denoting the high level of business cycle interdependencies.5
3.1.2. Spillover Plots
While the use of an average measure of business cycle spillovers provides a good indication of
business cycle transmission mechanism, it might mask interesting information on movements
in spillovers due to secular features of business cycles. Hence, we estimate the model in
Equation (1) using 60-month rolling windows and obtain the variance decompositions and
spillover indices.6 As a result, we obtain time-varying estimates of spillover indices, allowing
us to assess the intertemporal evolution of total and directional business cycle spillovers
within and between EU15 countries.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Figure 1 presents the results for the time-varying total spillover index obtained from the 60-
month rolling windows estimation. Large variability in the total spillover index is, indeed,
present and the index is very responsive to extreme economic events. For instance, the
total spillover index reaches a peak during Euro Area (EA) recessions, e.g. during the
1980s, 1992–1993, 2008–2009, as well as, at the onset of the Great Recession of 2007–2009.
Furthermore, the index follows a decreasing trend starting at the mid-1980s and reaches a
minimum just before the ERM II 1992 crisis. The road to the introduction of the Euro
4Note that according to the generalised spillover index approach of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012), directional
and net spillovers do not sum to 100%.
5We have explored the robustness of our results using alternative n–month ahead forecast error variance
decompositions (12, 36 and 48 months) and the results remain qualitatively similar.
6Our results reported below remain robust to alternative choices of window length (i.e. 36, 48 and 72
months).
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starts with a short-lived decline in spillovers between 1997 and 2001, and then follows an
increasing trend since the inception of the common currency. During the Great Recession,
business cycle spillovers reach unprecedented levels. In turn, the ongoing European debt
crisis withheld business cycle spillovers at very high levels; however, since 2013 a reversal
is observed with the spillover effects exhibiting a significant decrease. This may suggest
that EU15 countries gradually adapt to ongoing unstable conditions and spillover effects
are therefore somewhat anticipated. Overall, these results indicate that during economic
downturns, interdependencies across countries tend to increase significantly and are in line
with previous studies (Imbs, 2010; Yetman, 2011; Antonakakis, 2012a).
Despite results for the total spillover index being informative, they might discard di-
rectional information that is contained in the “Directional to others” row (Equation (5))
and the “Directional from others” column (Equation (6)) in Table 2. Figure 2 presents the
estimated 60-month rolling windows directional spillovers from each of the business cycles to
others (corresponding to the “Directional to others” row in Table 2), while Figure 3 presents
the estimated 60-month rolling windows directional spillovers from the others to each of the
business cycles (corresponding to the “Directional from others” column in Table 2).
[Insert Figure 2 here]
[Insert Figure 3 here]
According to these two figures, the bidirectional nature of business cycle spillovers between
the EU15 countries is evident. Nevertheless, they behave rather heterogeneously over time.
Specifically, according to Figure 2, only in the case of Spain directional spillovers from
business cycles exceed the 35% level during the EA recession of 2008–2009. Other than that,
directional spillovers from or to each business cycle range between 5%–30%. Interestingly
enough, the directional spillovers deriving from all other EU economies to each individual
business cycle appear to remain constant over time at a level of 7% for all countries. This is
suggestive of the fact that business cycle shocks are spread evenly across individual countries.
A similar picture emerges when looking at the net directional spillover indices obtained
from the 60-month rolling window estimation. According to Figure 4, which plots the time-
varying net directional spillovers, we see that Ireland, Spain and the UK are mostly net
transmitters of business cycles shocks during the sample period, while Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Italy and Portugal are mainly at the receiving ends of net busi-
ness cycle transmissions. The picture is mixed for Greece, Germany, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands and Sweden. Nevertheless, Greece appears to be a significant net transmit-
ter during the period just before the introduction of the Euro (possibly due the uncertainty
surrounding the country’s non compliance with the convergence criteria laid out in the Maas-
tricht Treaty) and prior and during the EA recession of 2008–2009. Interestingly, Greece is a
transmitter of business cycle shocks in the period before the European debt crisis, although
it maintains its net transmitting role in the first few months of the Eurozone debt crisis
(however, at a lesser extent). By contrast, during the European debt crisis, it is rather
Spain, Ireland and Italy that are transmitting business cycle shocks.
10
Overall, the findings suggest that the amplification of business cycle shocks across the
EU15, during the latest global financial crisis, may very well be attributed to Eurozone
peripheral countries and in particular to countries such as Spain, Ireland and Italy.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
3.1.3. Net Spillover Indices among Groups of Countries
To examine further the net spillover effects among the EU15 countries, we turn our attention
to net spillover effects among groups of countries, namely Eurozone core countries, Eurozone
peripheral countries and non-EMU countries. Figure 5 illustrates these net spillovers among
the three groups.
[Insert Figure 5 here]
In principle, net spillovers tend to be of great magnitude between the core and peripheral
Eurozone countries, followed by those between the core and non-EMU countries. The lowest
magnitude of net spillovers is observed between the peripheral and non-EMU countries.
Starting with net spillovers among core and peripheral countries we observe that both
groups can either be net transmitters or net receivers of business cycles shocks at different
time periods. In particular, during the period between the late 80s and the early 90s (i.e. the
ERM II period), as well as, in the years that followed the introduction of the euro currency,
core countries can be credited with transmitting business cycles shocks to the Eurozone
periphery. By contrast, during the years that followed the collapse of ERM II and until the
introduction of the euro, as well as, the post-2007 period (which is characterised by two EA
recessions and the Great Recession of 2007–2009) peripheral countries were, in general, the
main transmitters of business cycles shocks to the core countries.
Possibly the dynamic change in the nature of each group (i.e. net transmitter or net
receiver) can be explained by the transmission channel of business cycles shocks. More
specifically, the fact that core countries are the main transmitters during the ERM II period
may be explained by the dominant character of the German economy and by the fact that all
other countries pegged their currency to the Deutsche Mark and thus followed the German
monetary policy (see, for instance, Degiannakis et al., 2014). Turning to the Maastricht
Treaty period, the effort put by peripheral economies to meet the convergence criteria and
thus qualify to member EMU states, serves as a plausible explanation as to why peripheral
countries are the net transmitters of the period.
The following period; that is, the period after the adoption of the common currency and
until 2007, core countries become net transmitters and this could be explained on the basis
of increased structural funding, mainly provided by the core European members, in order for
the European periphery to overcome structural deficiencies and strengthen their economy.
Furthermore, results for the later period of our study (i.e. the post–2007 period), when
peripheral countries become net transmitters comes as no surprise, given that the GIIPS
(i.e. Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) were heavily affected by the economic
turbulence during the aforementioned period. In particular, following the Great Recession,
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many Eurozone peripheral countries experienced a deterioration in their government finances
in late 2009, that led to debt sustainability concerns in these countries. This, in turn, led
to financial market pressure and anxiety over a series of potential defaults and contagion to
other Eurozone countries.
Turning to the net spillovers between core and non-EMU countries, we observe that the
former countries are the main transmitters, apart from the period 2011–2012 when non-
EMU countries become net transmitters of business cycles shocks. This could potentially be
attributed to economic conditions in the UK. Similarly, the main net transmitters between
peripheral and non-EMU countries are the former countries. It is worth noting that the
magnitude of net spillover effects is higher during the last two EU recessions, as well as, in
the period between them.
3.1.4. Cumulative Generalised Impulse Response Functions
We further our analysis by providing a summary picture of the bottom line effect of business
cycle shocks. To achieve that, we calculate for each country the cumulative effects of a one–
standard deviation shock to business cycle on the respective country’s business cycle, referred
to as ‘within–country’ response, and the cumulative effects of a one–standard deviation shock
to business cycle on the other country’s business cycle, referred to as ‘between–country’
response.7 Table 3 reports the averages of the cumulative effects i) of business cycle shocks
on within–country business cycle, and ii) of business cycle shocks on between–country, for
the full sample period and for each group of countries (Eurozone core, Eurozone periphery
and non–EMU). The cumulative effects are reported for time horizons of 12, 24, 36 and 48
months. As the effects of business cycle shocks have fully materialized after 4 years, the
cumulative 48–month responses can be interpreted as overall bottom line effects of incipient
shocks including spillover effects and the associated repercussions.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Overall, all shocks have positive and multiplicative effects suggesting a positive (negative)
shock in a country leads to a positive (negative) response in other countries. In terms of the
within–country effects, we observe fairly low and of similar magnitude cumulative responses
for all three groups. In particular, the within–periphery responses amount to 5.097% followed
by those of within–non–EMU (4.335%) and within–core (3.663%). Of particular interest are
the cumulative response effects between–countries. First, own group shocks matter less than
cross group shocks for the Eurozone core and periphery, whereas the reverse holds true for
the non-EMU countries. Put differently, the core and periphery responses are more sizeable
to other group shocks as opposed to own group shocks. For instance, the response of core
countries business cycles to shocks originating in the core are lower (6.464%) compared to
their responses to shocks originating in the periphery (20.495%) and non–EMU countries
(9.539%). A similar pattern is also observed in the periphery where the largest in magnitude
7Notice that with a stationary VAR the cumulative effects of one–time business cycle shock have to be
interpreted as level effects and should not be confused with permanent effects on the business cycle.
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cumulative response effects is observed for the non–EMU to shocks (13.678%), while the
lowest are the responses to Eurozone core shocks (6.458%). Third, a somewhat different
picture is observed for the non–EMU countries, where the magnitude of their responses
to own–group shocks is very high (15.348%), followed by the responses to the periphery
(5.346%) and core countries (1.370%) shocks. Overall, it is evident that the Eurozone core
countries are showing to be affected significantly by shocks originating from other groups.
In addition, the non-EMU shocks seem to be of high importance to the periphery.
3.2. EU28
3.2.1. Spillover Indices
In recent years, the EU has been considerably enlarged to 28 countries with Croatia being the
most recent country to become a member state in 2013. It is worth noting that most of the
new accessions involve Eastern European Industrialising Economies (EEIE) while Cyprus
and Malta are the only new member states with a stronger focus on the tertiary sector of
the economy. From an empirical point of view it would be instructive to investigate spillover
effects among this enlarged group of 28 countries in order to assert whether the accession
of new members entails different outcomes regarding the net transmitting/receiving role of
each one of the sample countries. To refrain from unnecessary repetition of certain results,
analysis in this section mainly focuses on the new member states, aiming to identify specific
differences - if any - between the EU15 and the EU28 group of countries.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Table 4 reveals that as in the EU15 case, shocks originating within each EU28 economy
tend to be contained within the borders of each country (i.e. the main diagonal elements
of Table 4 receive higher values compared to off-diagonal elements). However, the inclusion
of the new EU countries results in a considerably higher total spillover index. In particular,
considering a full sample of EU28 counties, then on average, 79.36% of the forecast error
variance in all 28 countries relates to spillover effects of shocks across countries. In the
interests of comparison, the total spillover index for EU15 is 53.55% (see Table 2). What
is more, Spain remains the dominant transmitter (in both total and net terms) of business
cycle shocks for our extended sample of countries. However, considering net business cycle
spillovers for the EU28, we observe that contrary to their previous state, both Luxembourg
and the UK act as net recipients of spillover effects while Italy as a net transmitter. It should
also be noted that Estonia, Poland, as well as, the Czech Republic are the only three new
EU countries which exhibit a net transmitting character. Nonetheless, before we attempt to
interpret these findings and also in order to be consistent with our previous analysis it would
be instructive at this point to proceed with presenting the results of the dynamic spillover
effects among the EU28.
3.2.2. Spillover Plots
Figure 6 illustrates the dynamic evolution of the total spillover index obtained from a 60-
month rolling windows estimation. Considering a smaller sample due to data availability
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constraints, we notice that the EU28 total spillover index appears to be responsive to ex-
treme economic events. In particular, we observe a clear spike during the peak years of the
Great Recession, while from then onwards there is an upward trend mainly reflecting the
turbulent period associated with the European Debt Crisis. Apparently, there appears to be
a decreasing trend in very recent years; however, the value of the index remains at relatively
high levels.
[Insert Figure 6 here]
Turning to directional spillover effects among EU28 countries, Figures 7 and 8 reveals
that these spillovers behave rather heterogeneously over time.
[Insert Figure 7 here]
[Insert Figure 8 here]
As in the EU15 case, Spain obviously remains the dominant transmitter of business
cycle shocks during the years of the EA recession of 2008–2009 with a level of spillovers in
the region of 25% (see Figure 7). In more recent years, marked by the ongoing European
Debt Crisis, again we note the key role of Spain in transmitting business cycles shocks to
all other countries. In addition, we cannot discard the transmitting role of Austria and
Italy, especially in the beginning of the European Debt Crisis, as well as, the magnitude of
business cycles shocks originating in new EU members such as the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland. Shocks originating in Greece and Portugal on the other hand, appear to make
their presence noticed only in the very recent years of our sample, without in fact reaching
the quite extreme levels that might be expected for these two countries. Figure 8 is also
quite informative in that it enlightens us about the allocation of business cycle shocks across
the EU28 countries. From the spillovers depicted on Figure 8 it is obvious that business
cycle shocks are evenly spread across countries and that their level remains rather constant
across time; i.e. on the order of 5%.
In order to attain a better understanding of the underlying interdependencies it would
be useful to concentrate on net spillover effects (Figure 9). Concentrating on the European
Debt Crisis which started on the eve of 2009, we notice that all of the countries previously
reported to exhibit a high level of directional spillovers are in fact net transmitters of these
shocks. In particular, we underscore the key net transmitting role of countries such as Spain,
Austria and Italy (i.e. especially in the beginning of the European Debt Crisis), Greece and
Portugal (i.e. especially in more recent years), as well as, the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland (i.e. new EU members).
[Insert Figure 9 here]
In order to increase our understanding regarding the underlying interrelations between
the various groups of countries included in this study, we proceed with the investigation
of pairwise net spillover effects. Figure 10 reveals that core European countries are net
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recipients of spillover effects originating in peripheral countries such as Spain, Portugal and
Greece for almost the entire period since the beginning of the European Debt Crisis in early
2009. This result accords with previously reported findings regarding the EU15.
[Insert Figure 10 here]
What is also evident in Figure 10 is that new Euro Area members especially EEIE
also transmit spillover effects to core European countries. With reference to this particular
finding, it is worth noting that the main contributors of spillover effects - deriving from EEIE
- are the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. This finding is not surprising considering
the fact that all these countries (together with Slovakia and Slovenia) are in a relatively
better position by virtue of both development (i.e. foreign direct investments) and degree
of transition to a market–led system, compared to other industrialising countries in the
same geographical region (see, Carstensen and Toubal, 2004; Caporale et al., 2012, among
others). Growth in these countries can also be reflected upon the level of capitalisation
of their stock market. In particular, Caporale and Spagnolo (2011) report that the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland exhibit the highest market capitalisation compared to other
Central and Eastern European countries. In this regard, our findings further highlight the
importance of these countries in the region.
In order to attain a deeper understanding regarding the net transmitting role of EEIE
when paired with core European countries, it would be rather instructive to identify potential
strong links between these two groups of countries. According to Arezki et al. (2011) many
core European countries such as Austria, France, Germany and the Netherlands have very
strong financial linkages with Eastern European countries; a fact which renders the former
rather vulnerable to either positive or negative developments in the latter. According to
Caporale et al. (2012) early on in the 1990s many foreign banks became involved in a
process of holding majority shares in the banking sector of EEIE such as the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia; a fact which proved to be beneficial not only for the
financial sector but also for the broader economy of these industrialising economies. What is
more, Caporale and Spagnolo (2011) report that foreign investments in the aforementioned
group of EEIE have also been strongly supported by the fact that during the 1990s the
outbreak of financial crises in other developing countries of the world (e.g. Latin America)
resulted in a substantial increase of foreign investments in this particular group of EEIE.
A final point which emphasizes the connection between EEIE and core European coun-
tries can be found in the work of Marin (2006) and Marin and Verdier (2014) who put for-
ward the argument that developed economies such as Germany and Austria invest heartily
in EEIE in order to benefit from the relatively low labour cost. It follows that at times of
recession declining economic activity in industrialising countries may very well affect income
in the outsourcing countries.
Turning our attention the remaining results illustrated in Figure 10, we notice that
non-EMU countries receive spillover effects from all other group of countries (i.e. new-EA,
peripheral and core European countries). This finding could be an indication of further links
between these groups of countries. Finally, peripheral countries appear to transmit shocks
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to new-EA countries rather persistently in recent years a finding which emphasises the fact
that there are also links between these two groups of countries.
3.2.3. Cumulative Generalised Impulse Response Functions
Our analysis continues with the examination of the bottom effect of business cycle shocks, as
in Section 3.1.4. We examine both the ‘within–country’ responses (i.e. the cumulative effects
of a one–standard deviation shock to business cycle on the respective country’s business
cycle), as well as, the ‘between–country’ responses (i.e. the cumulative effects of a one–
standard deviation shock to business cycle on the other country’s business cycle). In Table
5 we report the average cumulative effects of i) business cycle shocks on within–country
business cycle and ii) business cycle shocks on between–country. The figures correspond to
the full sample period. In this section we group our sample countries as Eurozone core,
Eurozone periphery, Non–EMU and New–EA members). As previously, the cumulative
effects are reported for time horizons of 12, 24, 36 and 48 months, with the 48–month
responses to be considered as the overall bottom line effects.
[Insert Table 5 here]
As expected, all shocks have positive effects suggesting a positive (negative) shock in a
country leads to a positive (negative) response in other countries. Focusing on the 48–month
responses, we observe that, on the whole, the within–country effects are considerably lower
compared to the between–country effects. Furthermore, we notice that magnitude of cumu-
lative within–responses is somewhat different for the different groups, with the highest value
to recorded for the Eurozone periphery (9.873%), followed by the eurozone core (6.946%).
On the other hand, the within–country effects for the Non–EMU countries are fairly low
(3.374%) and the same holds for the New–EA members (5.452%).
Turning to the between–country effects, which are the most important, we notice that the
magnitude of the responses is greater for the shocks originating from the Eurozone periphery
and the New–EA members. This is an important findings which complement the analysis
of the EU15 member countries. More specifically, it clearly demonstrates the significance of
both the peripheral Eurozone economies, as well as, the economies of the New–EA members
to the stability of the European countries business cycles. More specifically, we observe
that the magnitude of responses from all groups to periphery shocks are above the level of
20%. The highest magnitude is reported from the core countries (28.190%), whereas the
lowest from the Non–EMU countries (22.978%). As aforementioned, shocks to the New–EA
members business cycles are also of high importance, with the responses from the country
groups to range between 6.371% (from the Non–EMU) to 11.990% (from the periphery).
The lowest responses are reported from the New–EA countries to shocks originating from
the Non–EMU group (0.439%). These results complement the findings reported in Section
3.1.4, as they show that apart from the importance of the Eurozone periphery, it is also the
New–EA members which are important transmitters of business cycle shocks.
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4. The effects of non–EU countries
So far, our analysis has been confined to business cycles spillovers effects within the EU.
That is, without taking into account the influence of business cycles spillovers from/to other
major non European countries, such as, the United States and China. Besides, there is
empirical evidence of increased international business cycle spillovers during the last two
decades (see, for instance, Antonakakis and Badinger, 2014, among others.). Therefore, to
control for such effects, as well as for robustness purposes, we repeat our business cycle
spillover analysis in the EU15 with the United States and China included.8
4.1. Spillover Indices
Table 6 presents the results of the spillover indices in the EU15 countries, the United
States and China, based on 24-month step-ahead forecast error variance decompositions.
[Insert Table 6 here]
According to this table, we can observe the following empirical regularities. First, among
the two non-European countries, the United States plays a very important role in the trans-
mission process of business cycles in almost all European countries, whereas China’s influ-
ence is less pronounced. For instance, on the one hand, innovations to business cycles in the
United States explain 26.20%, 21.82%, 17.58% and 14.10% of the 24-steap-ahead forecast
error variance of business cycles in the UK, Finland, Italy and Spain, respectively. On the
other hand, innovations to business cycles in China, explain, at best, 3.02% and 2.67% of the
24-step-ahead forecast error variance of business cycles in the United States and Sweden,
respectively. Second, Spain is still the dominant transmitter of business cycles shocks in
net terms (even after controlling for business cycle influences from/to other major non-EU
countries), followed by the United States, France, Luxembourg, and China. The rest of the
countries in the sample are on the net receiving ends of business cycle spillovers. These
results are supported by the ‘net spillovers’ in the last row of Table 6. Third, the total
spillover index presented at the lower right corner of Table 6, suggests that 59.28% of the
forecast error variance in the EU15 countries, the United States and China’s business cycles
comes from spillovers across countries. This total spillover index is very similar to that in
the EU15 group without the influence of non-EU countries (see Table 1).
Overall, the results of Table 6 indicate that the United States plays an important role
in the transmission process of business cycle spillover in the EU15.
8We have also performed the same analysis for the EU28 countries, with the United States and China
also included, and the results, which are available upon request, do not change. However, in the case of the
EU15 countries, the United States and China group, the availability of the time sample, and thus the rolling
window analysis, is more extended (from 1990M1 to 2014M2) compared to that in the EU28 countries, the
United States and China group (from 2000M1 to 2014M2). Thus we present only the results for the EU15
countries, the United States and China group for more completeness in our discussion.
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4.2. Spillover Plots
In an attempt to examine whether the effects of business cycle spillovers between the
EU15 countries and the United States and China vary over time, we proceed with the rolling
window analysis.
Figure 11 presents the time-varying total spillover index based on 60–month rolling
windows in the EU15 countries, the United States and China. As in the case of the EU15
countries (see Figure 1), the total spillover index in the EU15 with the United States and
China included exhibits similar patterns. That is, large variability is present overtime and
total spillovers reach a peak during periods of extreme economic activity, such as, the Asian
crisis, the inception of EMU and especially during the Great Recession.
[Insert Figure 11 here]
Turning our attention to the time-varying directional spillovers ‘from’ and ‘to’ each of
the EU15 countries, the Unites States and China that are presented in Figures 12 and
13, respectively, we observe some interesting patterns. According to Figure 12, the United
States is at the epicentre of business cycle spillovers to the EU15 countries and China during
global financial crisis that originated in the Unites States and led to the Great Recession
and the collapse of manufacturing worldwide, including Europe (Economist, 2009). During
that period, directional business cycle spillovers from the Unites States to the rest of the
countries in the sample reached unprecedented levels (approximately 50%), becoming twice
as high than those originating from Spain (around 25%). After that period, and during the
European debt crisis, directional spillovers originating from Spain, China, and to a lesser
extent, from Italy and Portugal, become more pronounced. As in the EU15 group (Figure
3), directional spillovers to each individual EU15 countries and the United States and China
from all others, presented in Figure 13, appear relatively constant overtime at a level of 5%;
thus suggesting that business cycle shocks are equally spread across countries.
[Insert Figure 12 here]
[Insert Figure 13 here]
The time-varying net spillovers of business cycle shocks presented in Figure 14, suggest
that, since the Great recession, the United States and Spain were on the net transmitting
ends of business cycles shocks. China joined the group of the net transmitters of business
cycles shocks in 2010, followed by Italy and Portugal in 2011 (during the European debt
crisis). Germany was a net transmitter of business cycle shocks until the beginning of
the Great Recession, and a net receiver of business cycle shocks after that. The changing
pattern (from net transmitter to net receiver) of business cycle shocks in Germany, could
be attributed to the increased uncertainty in the manufacturing sector due to a reduction
of foreign investment following investors’ concerns/anxiety about debt sustainability in the
Eurozone peripheral countries.
[Insert Figure 14 here]
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Finally, in Figure 15, we provide a summary of the time-varying spillover effects of
business cycles among the following four groups: (i) Eurozone core, (ii) Eurozone periphery,
(iii) non-EMU countries and (iv) the United States and China (named as World, henceforth).
According to this figure, net spillovers among the core and peripheral countries, and among
the core and the world, are more pronounced than those in the remaining pairs. Moreover,
net spillovers behave rather heterogenously overtime. The core countries are net transmitters
of business cycles shocks to non-EMU throughout the sample, while to the World only until
the beginning of the Great Recession, and to the peripheral countries between 2000 and
2008. During the Great Recession, the core countries become net receivers of business
cycles shocks from the World and the peripheral countries, while peripheral and non-EMU
countries become net receivers of business cycle shocks from non-EU/World countries.
[Insert Figure 15 here]
4.3. Cumulative Generalised Impulse Response Functions
We finalize our analysis with the examination of the bottom effects of business cycle shocks
as in Sections 3.1.4 and 3.2.3. Although this time we also focus on the responses to shocks
from and to the World business cycle group (i.e. from China and the US), in addition to
those from and to the Eurozone core, Eurozone periphery and Non-EMU groups. Table 7
reports the average cumulative effects of i) business cycle shocks on within–groups and ii)
business cycle shocks on between–groups.
[Insert Table 7 here]
In terms of the within–groups and between–groups responses among the core, periphery
and Non–EMU groups of countries we do not observe any notable difference between Tables
7 and 3. Focusing on the World group it is interesting to notice the very high level of
within–country responses (13.215%) suggesting that own country shocks are important to
the respective economies.
Turning to the between–groups responses, it is clear that the World group is significantly
influencing the Non–EMU countries, given the size of their responses (36.762%), as well as,
the Eurozone periphery (9.224%). Nevertheless, the core is also impacted, although to a
lesser extent (4.599%). On the other hand, the World group does not seem to respond
at a very high degree to shocks originating from the European groups. More specifically,
the magnitude of the World responses to shocks originating from the Eurozone core and
periphery are at about the same level (4.465% and 4.250%, respectively), whereas they
are significantly smaller to shocks from the Non–EMU countries (2.173%). Overall, these
findings depict the importance of the Chinese and the US business cycles shocks to the
European economy and complement the findings from the spillover effects, which showed
the same picture.
As a robustness analysis, we repeated the estimations for each of the 3 groupings (i.e.
EU15, EU28 and EU15, US and China) with the use of alternative rolling-window samples.
In particular, we experimented with 72-month (6-year) and 84-month (7-year) rolling win-
dows, in addition to 60-month (5-year) rolling-windows, and our results remain unchanged.
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For instance, Table A.1 in the Appendix, presents the minimum and maximum values of the
total spillovers of business cycles for each of the 3 groupings based on the aforementioned
alternative rolling-window samples. According to this table, business cycle spillovers reach
unprecedented heights during the Great Recession, and remain at high levels during the
ongoing European debt crisis. Overall, these results are in line with our main findings.
5. Conclusions
In this study we investigate the evolution of business cycle spillover effects in EU15 and
EU28 countries over the period 1977–2014. We also control for the influence of global busi-
ness cycle spillover effects. This study contributes to the understanding of the relationship
among European business cycles fluctuations. Monthly industrial production observations
are considered to be a proxy for countries’ GDP, while their cyclical components are ex-
tracted from the HP filter.
Our main findings can be summarised, as follows. According to the total spillover index,
53.96% of the forecast error variance in all EU15 countries’ business cycles can be explained
by cross–country spillovers. For the EU28 and the EU15–world cases, the total spillover
indices are 79.36% and 59.28%, respectively. Furthermore, we find that the indices exhibit
large dynamic variability while they can be very responsive to economic events, such as
downturns of economic activity.
Based on our time-varying analysis, prominent among our findings, is that directional
spillover effects originating from Spain are the most pronounced when considering the EU15
and EU28 cases. By contrast, in the case of EU15–world grouping, we find that the United
States is in the epicentre of spillover effects, especially during the Great Recession of 2007–
2008. That aside, most business cycles shocks are evenly spread across all other individual
countries.
However, if we turn our focus to the recent European debt crisis, it appears that it is
mostly the peripheral Eurozone countries which are the dominant transmitters of business
cycle shocks among the EU15 countries, whereas in the case of EU28, we observe that apart
from the peripheral Eurozone countries, they are the new-EA countries that are dominant
transmitters of shocks. Put differently, the core Eurozone countries are on the receiving
ends of business cycle shocks during the European debt crisis.
As far as core Eurozone countries, peripheral Eurozone countries, new–EA and non–EMU
countries are concerned, net spillovers tend to be of greater magnitude between core and
peripheral Eurozone countries, as well as, core and new–EA countries. In addition, evidence
suggests that the net transmitting or net receiving character of each group of countries is
time–specific in most cases.
We also provide evidence suggesting that non–EMU countries have been net receivers of
business cycles shocks from the core, the peripheral Eurozone and the new–EA countries, for
the most part of the sample period. It should be noted however, that between the years 2011
and 2012, non–EMU countries appear to have contributed to the transmission of business
cycle shocks to core Eurozone countries.
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Additional evidence further implies shocks originating from the Eurozone periphery trig-
ger considerable responses in all European groups. Finally, the cumulative response effects
are more sizeable to cross-group business cycle shocks compared to shocks originating from
own-group business cycles.
Summarising the results of the spillover effects among the world and the EU15, we find
that the US is the dominant transmitter of shocks during the Great Recession. However,
China is also showing a very important transmitting role of spillover effects, immediately
after the Great Recession , as well as, during the fist years of the European debt crisis.
Overall, this study provides new insights on the transmission mechanism and the feedback
effects of business cycle shocks in Europe. Prominent among our results is the fact that the
core Eurozone countries are receiving business cycle spillover effects from almost all country
groups. Furthermore, peripheral countries such as Spain (mainly) and Portugal and Greece
(to a lesser extent), as well as, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland exhibit a rather net–
transmitting character when it comes to business cycles shocks in the years that followed
the onset of the Great Recession. In this regard, shocks originating from the business cycles
of peripheral Eurozone countries and new–EA countries are very important for the EU28
and, especially, for the Eurozone core.
These finding stress the importance of adopting – at both the national and the in-
ternational level – the appropriate policy measures; that is, measures aiming to steer the
peripheral and new–EA economies on an even keel, away from turbulence and close to re-
covery.
As our analysis has focused solely on the business cycles transmission mechanism, a
straightforward avenue of future research, could be to extend the analysis by incorporating
additional channels, such as the financial sector, trade and the uncertainty channel.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of EU15 member countries’ business cycles (1977M1–2014M2)
obs min mean max Std. Dev. Skewness Excess Kurtosis Jarque-Bera ADF
AUT 462 -0.2280 0.0305 0.2000 0.0501 -1.5253*** 2.8185*** 113.57*** -5.445***
BEL 462 -0.1473 0.0206 0.1449 0.0482 -0.94961*** 1.0550*** 31.074*** -2.923**
BLG 162 -0.2699 0.0315 0.1733 0.0858 -1.4189*** 2.2618*** 86.698*** -3.307**
HRV 271 -0.3696 0.0027 0.2078 0.0804 -0.45378** -0.2033 5.6947* -5.826***
CYP 306 -0.3042 -0.0024 0.2825 0.0678 -0.39641** -0.0872 4.1881 -4.938***
CZE 247 -0.2392 0.0268 0.1595 0.0676 -1.5152*** 2.6826*** 107.84*** -2.962**
DNK 462 -0.2282 0.0204 0.2591 0.0753 -1.0955*** 1.6746*** 50.062*** -7.134***
EST 182 -0.3994 0.0546 0.3151 0.1225 -1.3898*** 3.0149*** 110.70*** -3.871***
FIN 463 -0.2642 0.0254 0.2107 0.0652 -1.4336*** 2.9536*** 111.55*** -3.034**
FRA 462 -0.2276 0.00676 0.1419 0.0411 -2.1033*** 5.2081*** 295.07*** -3.231**
GER 460 -0.2764 0.0171 0.1597 0.0554 -1.6538*** 3.6733*** 160.85*** -3.415**
GRC 463 -0.2352 0.0004 0.2478 0.0582 -0.64076*** 0.1969 11.067** -7.641***
HUN 403 -0.3201 0.0268 0.2392 0.0898 -1.8437*** 3.7138*** 180.31*** -2.921**
IRL 448 -0.1850 0.0632 0.3298 0.0764 0.30599 0.8484** 7.2043** -9.973***
ITA 460 -0.2951 0.00808 0.1642 0.0591 -1.8717*** 4.5060*** 225.92*** -3.328**
LVA 175 -0.2840 0.0444 0.3618 0.0974 -0.66303*** 2.3436*** 47.734*** -3.161**
LTU 199 -0.2540 0.0469 0.3192 0.1159 -0.32764* 0.2391 3.2032 -6.538***
LUX 462 -0.3145 0.0163 0.2439 0.0789 -1.3564*** 2.6880*** 96.018*** -3.561***
MLT 158 -0.2496 -0.0044 0.1670 0.0839 -0.42657** -0.1437 4.9275 -4.259***
NED 462 -0.2106 0.0142 0.1265 0.0424 -0.69670*** 2.5072*** 54.166*** -4.819***
POL 341 -0.3937 0.0340 0.2140 0.0979 -0.56848*** 0.4108 9.6215*** -3.671***
PRT 463 -0.1631 0.0196 0.2184 0.0561 -0.33046* 0.4430 4.1679 -6.397***
ROM 270 -0.4581 0.0170 0.1683 0.1073 -1.1118*** 2.2478*** 65.810*** -4.583***
SVK 293 -0.5517 0.0328 0.4082 0.1201 -1.3442*** 2.6129*** 92.529*** -3.096**
SVN 258 -0.2797 0.0151 0.1293 0.0679 -2.1757*** 5.0747*** 294.19*** -2.939**
ESP 460 -0.2663 0.0073 0.1274 0.0523 -1.9913*** 4.0067*** 210.10*** -2.978**
SWE 456 -0.2883 0.0091 0.4508 0.0708 -1.4955*** 2.9958*** 117.98*** -2.954**
UK 463 -0.1286 0.0066 0.0921 0.0380 -1.5602*** 3.0997*** 127.35*** -2.956**
US 464 -0.1628 0.0239 0.1149 0.0429 -1.8743*** 3.3887*** 168.11*** -3.193**
CHN 285 -0.2111 0.0023 0.4481 0.0587 1.5591*** 11.727*** 1748.5*** -11.89***
Note: ADF denotes Augmented Dickey Fuller tests with 10%, 5% and 1% critical values of -2.5704, -2.8682
and -3.4457, respectively. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3: Generalised cumulative impulse responses, EU15 (1977M1–2014M2)
From (j)
Within–country Between–country
To(i) Core Periphery Non-EMU Core Periphery Non-EMU
12-months
Core 3.434 5.416 10.623 4.719
Periphery 3.979 5.955 5.585 7.008
Non-EMU 3.466 0.013 6.549 13.913
24-months
Core 3.710 6.432 16.759 7.854
Periphery 4.776 6.776 7.240 11.705
Non-EMU 4.117 1.032 6.606 15.185
36-months
Core 3.666 6.469 19.456 9.091
Periphery 5.013 6.555 7.702 13.215
Non-EMU 4.283 1.307 5.799 15.121
48-months
Core 3.663 6.464 20.495 9.539
Periphery 5.097 6.458 7.837 13.678
Non-EMU 4.335 1.370 5.346 15.348
Notes: Cumulative generalized impulse response to one standard deviation shock, multiplied by 100 (in %).
All entries are averages over country-specific shocks to the respective business cycle.
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Table 5: Generalised cumulative impulse responses, EU28 (2000M1–2014M2)
From (j)
Within–country Between–country
To(i) Core Periphery Non-EMU New-EA Core Periphery Non-EMU New-EA
12-months
Core 3.451 3.385 20.495 4.472 7.950
Periphery 4.357 6.626 15.587 1.746 7.312
Non-EMU 2.554 1.431 18.328 5.399 4.600
New-EA 3.271 11.534 16.011 0.150 5.387
24-months
Core 4.230 4.274 22.644 5.893 9.293
Periphery 6.124 7.132 16.208 2.482 8.011
Non-EMU 2.586 1.534 20.636 6.974 5.889
New-EA 3.923 12.074 19.611 0.299 7.979
36-months
Core 5.103 4.356 24.161 6.439 10.775
Periphery 7.495 7.277 18.334 2.829 10.667
Non-EMU 2.798 1.600 21.766 7.461 6.263
New-EA 4.488 13.804 22.513 0.419 9.744
48-months
Core 6.946 4.843 28.190 6.542 11.630
Periphery 9.873 8.085 20.657 3.193 11.990
Non-EMU 3.374 1.983 22.978 7.616 6.371
New-EA 5.452 14.169 23.098 0.439 10.193
Notes: Cumulative generalized impulse response to one standard deviation shock, multiplied by 100 (in %).
All entries are averages over country-specific shocks to the respective business cycle.
29
T
ab
le
6:
S
p
il
lo
ve
r
ta
b
le
o
f
b
u
si
n
es
s
cy
cl
e
sh
o
ck
s
in
E
U
1
5
,
U
S
a
n
d
C
h
in
a
(1
9
7
7
M
1
–
2
0
1
4
M
2
)
F
ro
m
(j
)
T
o
(i
)
A
U
T
B
E
L
D
N
K
F
IN
F
R
A
G
E
R
G
R
C
IR
L
IT
A
L
U
X
N
E
D
P
R
T
E
S
P
S
W
E
U
K
U
S
C
H
N
F
ro
m
O
th
er
s
A
U
T
2
7
.1
2
1
.2
5
0
.7
4
2
.8
4
7
.6
5
6
.7
5
1
.3
6
0
.9
0
2
.8
3
4
.5
2
1
.6
9
0
.5
6
1
7
.4
5
6
.1
6
3
.0
0
1
3
.6
3
1
.5
5
7
2
.8
8
B
E
L
1
.4
7
2
7
.3
2
2
.2
4
1
.3
8
7
.6
6
6
.5
4
0
.5
2
0
.3
9
4
.4
2
5
.5
6
1
.1
5
4
.7
2
2
0
.5
5
1
.5
1
2
.7
7
1
0
.8
2
0
.9
8
7
2
.6
8
D
N
K
1
.5
4
1
.7
6
5
0
.9
7
2
.1
2
3
.7
6
1
.2
5
0
.2
9
0
.6
8
2
.4
8
3
.9
9
0
.5
7
1
.3
9
1
3
.6
4
2
.9
0
1
.9
0
1
0
.0
3
0
.7
5
4
9
.0
3
F
IN
3
.2
5
2
.3
6
0
.7
7
2
5
.4
4
3
.5
8
1
.3
7
1
.8
0
0
.1
4
3
.1
4
4
.1
0
1
.4
0
0
.0
8
1
4
.1
7
6
.0
5
8
.4
3
2
1
.8
2
2
.1
0
7
4
.5
6
F
R
A
1
.8
4
1
.5
7
0
.9
2
1
.0
8
1
7
.4
7
6
.0
5
0
.3
2
0
.5
6
6
.5
2
6
.3
3
2
.1
1
1
.4
4
2
6
.0
5
3
.7
6
5
.1
8
1
6
.9
5
1
.8
4
8
2
.5
3
G
E
R
1
.3
4
1
.8
7
0
.9
7
1
.1
6
1
2
.5
9
2
1
.9
8
0
.3
8
1
.4
3
4
.6
6
4
.9
1
1
.7
5
1
.6
5
2
1
.1
0
4
.4
9
2
.4
1
1
5
.3
6
1
.9
5
7
8
.0
2
G
R
C
1
.7
0
3
.0
3
0
.0
4
2
.0
1
1
.9
2
0
.9
9
6
5
.4
7
0
.2
3
0
.2
0
1
.3
1
1
.1
2
0
.1
8
9
.4
9
7
.2
1
1
.4
8
2
.8
1
0
.7
9
3
4
.5
3
IR
L
1
.1
3
1
.7
5
0
.3
9
2
.1
1
1
.8
6
1
.0
1
1
.2
4
5
7
.5
1
3
.5
2
1
.9
4
0
.4
9
5
.5
3
1
2
.2
6
0
.6
7
2
.8
2
5
.4
5
0
.3
3
4
2
.4
9
IT
A
2
.1
7
1
.7
4
0
.4
8
1
.0
8
8
.4
9
3
.3
2
0
.2
0
0
.3
0
1
7
.0
2
7
.3
8
0
.7
2
1
.7
1
2
7
.1
0
2
.8
6
6
.0
9
1
7
.5
8
1
.7
5
8
2
.9
8
L
U
X
1
.3
9
1
.4
9
2
.1
9
1
.3
0
4
.5
7
2
.1
6
0
.1
3
0
.2
0
3
.2
9
4
3
.8
0
1
.1
5
1
.6
0
2
1
.2
1
2
.2
0
4
.8
2
6
.9
6
1
.5
4
5
6
.2
0
N
E
D
1
.2
3
1
.1
7
1
.3
2
0
.7
5
1
1
.0
4
1
.9
8
0
.2
0
0
.6
2
3
.8
3
3
.0
6
4
4
.6
8
0
.6
5
1
0
.8
0
1
.6
6
6
.9
5
8
.0
2
2
.0
3
5
5
.3
2
P
R
T
0
.6
3
3
.1
2
0
.8
3
0
.2
8
4
.4
4
2
.4
3
0
.2
8
4
.6
9
7
.2
2
2
.0
0
0
.6
7
4
8
.6
6
1
8
.7
3
0
.9
5
1
.4
2
2
.9
1
0
.7
4
5
1
.3
4
E
S
P
1
.6
8
1
.6
1
0
.2
2
1
.3
0
8
.0
0
1
.8
0
1
.3
8
0
.1
8
5
.2
1
5
.4
6
0
.1
6
2
.1
2
4
8
.2
7
3
.4
2
4
.2
0
1
4
.1
0
0
.8
8
5
1
.7
3
S
W
E
1
.3
9
0
.9
4
0
.6
1
2
.8
3
5
.3
3
6
.2
1
4
.2
0
1
.3
8
1
.3
8
4
.0
9
0
.9
4
0
.5
8
9
.5
7
3
7
.0
9
7
.0
9
1
3
.6
9
2
.6
7
6
2
.9
1
U
K
5
.8
0
3
.1
5
1
.0
7
1
.3
4
3
.9
7
3
.0
3
0
.2
8
0
.0
6
3
.6
4
4
.8
5
0
.9
8
0
.1
7
1
3
.8
4
2
.6
9
2
6
.4
9
2
6
.2
0
2
.4
3
7
3
.5
1
U
S
5
.9
9
3
.5
0
0
.4
4
1
.8
2
4
.2
1
1
.6
8
0
.2
9
0
.6
7
1
.2
4
2
.9
9
1
.1
2
0
.0
3
1
2
.4
9
3
.2
2
2
.4
4
5
4
.8
5
3
.0
2
4
5
.1
5
C
H
N
0
.8
2
3
.1
2
3
.1
3
0
.7
7
1
.4
6
1
.3
4
0
.4
9
0
.2
3
0
.9
1
1
.4
8
1
.4
4
1
.3
0
0
.3
8
0
.9
9
0
.5
8
3
.4
7
7
8
.1
1
2
1
.8
9
C
o
n
tr
.
to
o
th
er
s
3
3
.3
6
3
3
.4
4
1
6
.3
7
2
4
.1
8
9
0
.5
4
4
7
.9
2
1
3
.3
4
1
2
.6
9
5
4
.5
1
6
3
.9
8
1
7
.4
7
2
3
.7
0
2
4
8
.8
2
5
0
.7
6
6
1
.5
7
1
8
9
.8
1
2
5
.3
3
T
o
ta
l
S
p
il
lo
v
er
C
o
n
tr
.
in
cl
.
o
w
n
6
0
.4
8
6
0
.7
6
6
7
.3
3
4
9
.6
1
1
0
8
.0
1
6
9
.9
0
7
8
.8
1
7
0
.2
0
7
1
.5
3
1
0
7
.7
8
6
2
.1
5
7
2
.3
5
2
9
7
.0
9
8
7
.8
4
8
8
.0
6
2
4
4
.6
5
1
0
3
.4
4
In
d
ex
=
5
9
.2
8
%
N
et
sp
il
lo
v
er
s
-3
9
.5
2
-3
9
.2
4
-3
2
.7
7
-5
0
.4
9
8
.0
1
-3
0
.1
0
-2
1
.1
9
-2
9
.8
0
-2
8
.4
7
7
.7
8
-3
7
.8
5
-2
7
.6
5
1
9
7
.0
9
-1
2
.1
6
-1
1
.9
4
1
4
4
.6
5
3
.4
4
N
ot
e:
S
p
il
lo
ve
r
in
d
ic
es
,
gi
v
en
b
y
E
q
u
at
io
n
s
(2
)–
(7
),
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
fr
o
m
va
ri
a
n
ce
d
ec
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
s
b
a
se
d
o
n
2
4
–
st
ep
-a
h
ea
d
fo
re
ca
st
s.
30
Table 7: Generalised cumulative impulse responses, EU15, US and China (1977M1–2014M2)
From (j)
Within–country Between–country
To(i) Core Periphery Non-EMU World Core Periphery Non-EMU World
12-months
Core 2.967 0.325 12.508 7.710 4.382
Periphery 3.737 2.537 5.601 3.948 9.492
Non-EMU 2.788 2.082 11.722 5.191 16.364
World 6.117 1.112 1.340 1.279 9.006
24-months
Core 2.979 0.472 17.687 8.172 4.315
Periphery 4.444 3.337 7.339 4.123 10.183
Non-EMU 3.180 3.078 14.447 6.936 26.530
World 9.646 2.742 2.457 1.745 13.642
36-months
Core 2.843 0.912 19.756 10.053 4.421
Periphery 4.700 4.403 8.115 4.165 9.537
Non-EMU 3.365 3.585 15.200 8.535 32.720
World 11.811 3.802 3.501 1.999 16.385
48-months
Core 2.751 0.907 20.880 12.824 4.599
Periphery 4.842 5.204 8.549 4.154 9.224
Non-EMU 3.486 3.916 15.594 9.757 36.762
World 13.215 4.465 4.250 2.173 18.224
Notes: Cumulative generalized impulse response to one standard deviation shock, multiplied by 100 (in %).
All entries are averages over country-specific shocks to the respective business cycle.
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Figure 1: Total spillover of business cycles in the EU15
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Note: Plot of moving total spillover index estimated using 60-month rolling windows (and hence starting in
1982M2). Grey shaded areas denote EA recessions based on CEPR business cycle dating committee.
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Figure 2: Directional spillovers FROM each of the EU15 business cycles to all others
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Note: Plot of moving directional spillover indices estimated using 60-month rolling windows (and hence
starting in 1982M2). Grey shaded areas denote EA recessions based on CEPR business cycle dating com-
mittee.
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Figure 3: Directional spillovers TO each of the EU15 business cycles from all others
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Note: Plot of moving directional spillover indices estimated using 60-month rolling windows (and hence
starting in 1982M2). Grey shaded areas denote EA recessions based on CEPR business cycle dating com-
mittee.
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Figure 4: Net spillovers of business cycles in the EU15
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Note: Plot of moving net spillover indices estimated using 60-month rolling windows (and hence starting in
1982M2). Grey shaded areas denote EA recessions based on CEPR business cycle dating committee.
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Figure 5: Net spillovers of business cycles among Eurozone core, Eurozone periphery and non-EMU
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Note: Plot of moving net spillover indices estimated using 60-month rolling windows (and hence starting in
1982M2). Grey shaded areas denote EA recessions based on CEPR business cycle dating committee.
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Figure 6: Total spillover of business cycles in the EU28
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Note: Plot of moving total spillover index estimated using 60-month rolling windows (and hence starting in
2006M2). Grey shaded areas denote EA recessions based on CEPR business cycle dating committee.
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Figure 7: Directional spillovers FROM each of the EU28 business cycles to all others
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Note: Plot of moving directional spillover indices estimated using 60-month rolling windows (and hence
starting in 2006M2). Grey shaded areas denote EA recessions based on CEPR business cycle dating com-
mittee.
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Figure 8: Directional spillovers TO each of the EU28 business cycles from all others
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Note: Plot of moving directional spillover indices estimated using 60-month rolling windows (and hence
starting in 2006M2). Grey shaded areas denote EA recessions based on CEPR business cycle dating com-
mittee.
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Figure 9: Net spillovers of business cycles in the EU28
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Note: Plot of moving net spillover indices estimated using 60-month rolling windows (and hence starting in
2006M2). Grey shaded areas denote EA recessions based on CEPR business cycle dating committee.
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Figure 10: Net spillovers of business cycles among Eurozone core, Eurozone periphery, non-EMU and new–
EA members
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Note: Plot of moving net spillover indices estimated using 60-month rolling windows (and hence starting in
2006M2). Grey shaded areas denote EA recessions based on CEPR business cycle dating committee.
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Figure 11: Total spillover of business cycles in the EU15, US and China
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Note: Plot of moving total spillover index estimated using 60-month rolling windows (and hence starting in
1982M2). Grey shaded areas denote EA recessions based on CEPR business cycle dating committee.
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Figure 12: Directional spillovers FROM each of the EU15, US and China business cycles to all others
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Note: Plot of moving directional spillover indices estimated using 60-month rolling windows (and hence
starting in 1982M2). Grey shaded areas denote EA recessions based on CEPR business cycle dating com-
mittee.
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Figure 13: Directional spillovers TO each of the EU15, US and China business cycles from all others
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Note: Plot of moving directional spillover indices estimated using 60-month rolling windows (and hence
starting in 1982M2). Grey shaded areas denote EA recessions based on CEPR business cycle dating com-
mittee.
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Figure 14: Net spillovers of business cycles in the EU15, US and China
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Note: Plot of moving net spillover indices estimated using 60-month rolling windows (and hence starting in
1982M2). Grey shaded areas denote EA recessions based on CEPR business cycle dating committee.
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Figure 15: Net spillovers of business cycles among Eurozone core, Eurozone periphery, non–EMU, new-EA
members and non-EU (US and China)
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Note: Plot of moving net spillover indices estimated using 60-month rolling windows (and hence starting in
1982M2). Grey shaded areas denote EA recessions based on CEPR business cycle dating committee.
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Appendix
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Figure A.1: Total spillover of business cycles in the EU15, EA18, and EU15 and US and China, with
alternative rolling window samples
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Note: Plot of moving total spillover index estimated using 60-month (5-year), 72-months (6-year) and 84-
months (7-year) rolling windows. Grey shaded areas denote EA recessions based on CEPR business cycle
dating committee.
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Table A.1: Data availability and sources of industrial production
Country Abbreviation Data Availability Source
Austria AUT 1977M1–2014M6 IMF-IFS
Belgium BEL 1977M1–2014M6 IMF-IFS
Bulgaria BLG 2000M1–2014M6 IMF-IFS
Croatia HRV 1991M1–2014M7 IMF-IFS
Cyprus CYP 1988M1–2014M6 IMF-IFS
Czech Republic CZE 1993M1–2014M7 IMF-IFS
Denmark DNK 1977M1–2014M6 IMF-IFS
Estonia EST 1998M1–2014M2 IMF-IFS
Finland FIN 1977M1–2014M7 IMF-IFS
France FRA 1977M1–2014M6 IMF-IFS
Germany GER 1977M1–2014M4 IMF-IFS
Greece GRE 1977M1–2014M7 IMF-IFS
Hungary HUN 1980M1–2014M7 IMF-IFS
Ireland IRL 1977M1–2014M4 IMF-IFS
Italy ITA 1977M1–2014M4 IMF-IFS
Latvia LVA 1999M1–2014M7 IMF-IFS
Lithuania LTU 1997M1–2014M7 IMF-IFS
Luxembourg LUX 1977M1–2014M6 IMF-IFS
Malta MLT 2000M1–2014M2 IMF-IFS
Netherlands NED 1977M1–2014M6 IMF-IFS
Poland POL 1985M1–2014M7 IMF-IFS
Portugal PRT 1977M1–2014M7 IMF-IFS
Romania ROM 1991M1–2014M6 IMF-IFS
Slovakia SVK 1989M1–2014M5 IMF-IFS
Slovenia SVN 1992M1–2014M6 IMF-IFS
Spain ESP 1977M1–2014M4 IMF-IFS
Sweden SWE 1977M1–2014M6 IMF-IFS
United Kingdom UK 1977M1–2014M7 IMF-IFS
United States US 1977M1–2014M8 IMF-IFS
China CHN 1990M1–2014M9 NBS, China
Note: IMF-IFS denotes the International Financial Statistics (IFS) maintained by the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF). NBS, China stems for National Bureau of Statistics, China.
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